文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：董事高管责任保险会诱发企业真实盈余管理吗?

英文题名：Does Directors’and Officers’Liability Insurance Induce Real Earnings Management?

作者：方拥军[1];申留笛[1];朱晓琳[2]

第一作者：方拥军

机构：[1]河南财经政法大学会计学院;[2]郑州航空工业管理学院商学院

第一机构：河南财经政法大学会计学院

年份：2021

期号：2

起止页码：57-76

中文期刊名：会计论坛

外文期刊名：Accounting Forum

语种：中文

中文关键词：董事高管责任保险;真实盈余管理;企业风险承担

外文关键词：Directors’and Officers’Liability Insurance;Real Earnings Management;Enterprise Risk Taking

摘要：本文以2010~2019年沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了董事高管责任保险的引入对上市公司真实盈余管理的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,董事高管责任保险与真实盈余管理正相关,说明董事高管责任保险助长了高管的机会主义行为;董事高管责任保险的"兜底"效应诱发高管更多的冒进行为,提高了企业风险承担水平,进而加剧了真实盈余管理,即风险承担在二者之间发挥中介效应。通过拓展性研究发现,在民营企业及外部审计规模较小的情景下,董事高管责任保险与公司真实盈余管理之间的相关性更强。本文研究加深了资本市场对董事高管责任保险治理效应的认知,对相关法律法规的健全及监管部门的发展具有一定的参考意义。
Taking 2010-2019 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as samples,this paper makes an empirical test of the influence and mechanism of the directors’and officers’liability insurance on the listed companies’real earnings management.The results show that liability insurance is positively correlated with real earnings management,which indicates that directors’and officers’liability insurance promotes executives’opportunistic behavior.The“bottom line”effect of directors’and officers’liability insurance induces more aggressive behaviors of executives,improves the risk-taking level of enterprises,and then intensifies the real earnings management,that is,risk taking plays a mediating effect between the two.Through the extended research,it is found that there is a stronger correlation between directors’and officers’liability insurance and the company’s real earnings management in the context of private enterprises and small external audit scale.This study further deepens the cognition of the capital market on the governance effect of directors’and officers’liability insurance,and provides certain reference significance for the improvement of relevant laws and regulations and the development of regulatory authorities.