文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：互联网众筹平台与监管部门演化博弈稳定性分析

英文题名：An Analysis on the Stability of Evolutionary Game between Crowdfunding Platforms and Supervisory Authorities

作者：何奇龙[1];王先甲[2];钟肖英[3]

第一作者：何奇龙

机构：[1]河南财经政法大学数学与信息科学学院;[2]武汉大学经济管理学院;[3]中山大学南方学院

第一机构：河南财经政法大学数学与信息科学学院

年份：2018

卷号：32

期号：6

起止页码：157-163

中文期刊名：华东经济管理

外文期刊名：East China Economic Management

收录：国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2017】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2017_2018】；

基金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(71231007)

语种：中文

中文关键词：互联网金融;演化博弈;众筹平台;监管部门

外文关键词：internet finance;evolutionary- game;erowdfunding platform;supervisory authorities

摘要：互联网众筹平台跑路风险频频发生,给投资者带来巨大风险,影响众筹行业发展。文章通过建立复制动态方程,从演化博弈的视角分析了监管部门和众筹平台之间的博弈策略演化过程,得出双方策略的演化稳定均衡。研究表明,严格监管相对于宽松监管所耗费监管成本差距、对违规经营的众筹平台的惩罚金额、监管部门以及众筹平台的声誉损失、违规经营的超额收益、第三方媒体或投资者对违规经营行为的举报是影响博弈双方策略选择,进而影响众筹行业发展的关键因素。通过对均衡点稳定性的分析,针对如何促进众筹平台的合规经营,监管部门的严格监管,提出了一些政策建议。
The frequent occurrence of Internet crowdfunding platforms running away brings huge risks to investors and affects the development of crowdfunding industry seriously. By establishing the replicator dynamics equation,this paper analyzes the game strategy selection process between crowdfunding platforms and supervisory authorities from the perspective of evolutionary game,and gets the evolutionary stable strategies of the two sides. The study shows that the supervisory cost gap between strict supervision and lax regulation,the penalties for illegal operations of crowdfunding platforms,the reputational losses on both sides,the excess returns from illegal operations and the reports of third party medias or investors on illegal operations are the key factors to influence strategy selection,thus,to affect the development of the crowdfunding industry. Through the analysis of the stability of the equilibrium,the paper puts forward some suggestions on how to promote the compliance management of crowdfunding platforms and the strict supervision of supervisory authorities.