文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：地方政府竞争的博弈分析——以引进外资为例

英文题名：A Game Analysis of the Competition among Local Governments

作者：王然[1]

第一作者：王然

机构：[1]河南财经学院经济系学

第一机构：河南财经政法大学经济学院

年份：2007

期号：5

起止页码：4-6

中文期刊名：经济经纬

外文期刊名：Economic Survey

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2004】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2006_2007】；

语种：中文

中文关键词：地方政府竞争;完全信息静态博弈;囚徒困境;负外部性

外文关键词：competition among local governments; complete information static game; prisoners＇dilemma; negative externality

摘要：为了提高政绩,地方政府纷纷以优惠政策来吸引外资,并为此展开了"优惠政策大战"。不同行政区划、不同级别的地方政府间的这种竞争是有差别的,其中同一行政区划内同一级别地方政府间的竞争是最主要的。为外资提供优惠政策是地方政府官员的占优战略,但却是社会的劣战略。原因在于该行动存在负外部性。只有消除这种负外部性,才能避免"优惠政策大战"。
To improve the achievements in official career, local governments have to provide the preferential policies to attract foreign investment. The competition between defferent administrative regions and different levels of local governments is different and the competition in the same administrative region and the same level of local government is the most important. This kind of action is the dominant strategy for local government officials, but it is not the dominant strategy for the society. The reason lies in that this kind of action has negative externality. Oaly by eliminating the negative externalities can ＂the war of preferential policies＂ be avoided.