文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：CEO权力、高管团队薪酬差距与企业风险承担

英文题名：CEO Power,Internal Compensation Dispersion and Firm Risk-Taking

作者：朱晓琳[1];方拥军[2]

第一作者：朱晓琳

机构：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院;[2]河南财经政法大学会计学院

第一机构：中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073

年份：2018

卷号：35

期号：1

起止页码：100-107

中文期刊名：经济经纬

外文期刊名：Economic Survey

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2017】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2017_2018】；

基金：国家自然科学青年基金项目(71602049);中南财经政法大学研究生创新课题(2016Y1132)

语种：中文

中文关键词：薪酬差距;企业风险承担;CEO权力;晋升激励

外文关键词：Compensation Gap ; Firm Risk-taking ; CEO Power ; Promotion Incentive

摘要：基于委托代理理论中代理人风险规避假说,探讨高管团队薪酬差距对企业风险承担水平的影响,并考察CEO权力对二者关系的调节作用。研究结果表明:高管团队薪酬差距能够提升企业风险承担水平,但这一激励效应仅存在于非国有企业中,说明非国有企业中高管团队内部差别化的薪酬体系能起到晋升激励的作用,进而缓解经理人风险规避问题;CEO权力对高管团队薪酬差距与企业风险承担的关系存在负向调节作用。研究结论不但丰富了企业内部薪酬差距的研究,而且对于改善我国企业风险承担水平普遍不高的现状具有一定的现实意义。
Based on Agent Risk Aversion Hypothesis in Principal Agent Theory, this paper discusses the influence of the compensation gap in top executive team on the degree of risk-taking in firms, and the moderating effect on the relationship between them that is brought about by CEO power. Results show that the compensation gap can enhance firms＇ risk-taking but this positive correlation only exists in non-state-owned enterprises. This shows that the internal compensation difference in top management teams of non-state-owned enterprises can stimulate promotion, resulting in easing the tension in agent risk aversion. In addition, the managerial power from CEO will curb this stimulating effect between those two variables. The conclusions not only enrich the study on internal compensation dispersion in firms, but also have practical significance in improving the current low level of risk-taking among enterprises.