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多个大股东影响企业违规的机制研究    

Research on the Mechanism of Multiple Large Shareholders Influence on Corporate Violation

文献类型:期刊文献

中文题名:多个大股东影响企业违规的机制研究

英文题名:Research on the Mechanism of Multiple Large Shareholders Influence on Corporate Violation

作者:赵彦锋[1];申子峰[1];安庆钊[1]

第一作者:赵彦锋

机构:[1]河南财经政法大学会计学院,河南郑州450046

第一机构:河南财经政法大学会计学院

年份:2023

卷号:41

期号:1

起止页码:38-50

中文期刊名:郑州航空工业管理学院学报

外文期刊名:Journal of Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics

基金:2022河南省软科学研究计划项目(222400410614);河南省研究生教育改革与质量提升工程项目(YJS2021AL096);2019年国家社会科学基金重点项目(19AGL011)。

语种:中文

中文关键词:多个大股东;企业违规;信息不对称;公司治理

外文关键词:multiple large shareholders;corporate violation;information asymmetric;corporate governance

摘要:多个大股东并存是现代企业股权结构的重要形式,但对其如何影响企业违规的研究缺乏。以我国沪深A股2007—2020年上市公司为样本,文章考察了多个大股东对企业违规的影响及其机理,形成以下结论:多个大股东能够抑制企业违规行为;机制分析显示,缓解代理冲突、降低经营风险、改善信息环境是多个大股东减少企业违规的主要渠道;异质性分析表明,在企业内部治理较弱时,多个大股东抑制企业违规的效应更显著。研究丰富了多个大股东经济后果以及企业违规影响因素的文献,同时为企业通过优化股权结构,降低企业违规提供借鉴。
With the decentralization of stock ownership,the coexistence of multiple large shareholders has become an important stock ownership structure,and there is a lack of research on how it affects corporate violations.Taking the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2020 as samples,this paper investigates the influence of multiple large shareholders on corporate malpractices and its mechanism,and comes to the following conclusions:Multiple large shareholders can restrain corporate malpractices;mechanism analysis shows that alleviating agency conflicts,reducing business risks and improving information environment are the main channels for multiple large shareholders to reduce corporate violations.Heterogeneity analysis shows that when the internal governance of the enterprise is weak,the effect of multiple major shareholders on restraining corporate violations is more significant.The research enriches the literatures on the economic consequences of multiple large shareholders and the factors influencing the violation of enterprise rules,and provides reference for enterprises to reduce corporate violations by optimizing the ownership structure.

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