文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：转型土地管理制度变迁绩效及其制度逻辑

英文题名：Transition Performance of Land Management System and Its Institutional Logic

作者：曹飞[1]

第一作者：曹飞

机构：[1]河南财经政法大学工程管理与房地产学院房地产经营管理系

第一机构：河南财经政法大学工程管理与房地产学院

年份：2017

卷号：0

期号：3

起止页码：43-54

中文期刊名：社会科学

外文期刊名：Journal of Social Sciences

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2014】；社科基金资助期刊;CSSCI:【CSSCI2017_2018】；

基金：国家社会科学基金青年项目"系统动力学视角下新型城镇化进程与土地利用效率的耦合机制研究"(项目编号:14CJY020)的阶段性成果

语种：中文

中文关键词：放权与限权;制度变迁;土地管理;土地治理;路径依赖

外文关键词：Decentralization and Limited Rights; Institutional Change; Land Management; LandGovernance; Path Dependence

摘要：土地管理制度变迁体现着转型时期国家和地方的角色和职能界定,而不仅是土地制度变迁和制度供给问题,以中央向地方放权和收权为中心的土地管理中包含了资源配置、资本俘获和用途管制等多重治理目标,土地管理法实施以来土地权利与土地义务在国家-地方-集体与农(市)民间呈现较高程度的非对称分布。而土地管理制度变迁过程呈现着以下特征:中央对地方严格实施自上而下土地指标管控,但部分赋予地方在指标利用上探索的权利;中央赋予地方强制型垄断市场权力于并以用途管制和规划限制其权力行使;中央赋予集体部分社会与市场参与权利,但以集体产权边界和用途管制及规划限制其权利行使。这一放权与收权限制的制度格局所引发的外部性表现为:用途管制的绩效消弭、政府权力市场获利机制的建立与集体福利消散、社会资本力量与社会参与合作治理不足。由土地权利与土地义务配置失衡所带来财产与风险(不稳定)的分配失衡则是这种渐进式的治理朝向改革的制度成本。土地管理的进一步制度变迁将遵循既有的这种模式渐进式进行。
Change of land management system embodies the definition of the roles and functions of the transition＇s state and local government, and is not only the land institutional change and institu- tional supply, the central decentralization and give fight to local as the center of the land management system contains multiple objectives of the management of the allocation of resources, capital captured and land use control, Land rights and land obligations in national and local ,collective and agricultural （city） folk show a higher degree of asymmetric distribution since the implementation of the land admin- istration law. And the process of land management system change has the following characteristics： Central control local by strict implementation of top-down land index, but given fights to the local to explore the use of indicators; giving local the monopoly market power and limited the power by the ad- ministration of land use; giving local part of the social collective and market participation fights, but limit local＇s fight by the town planning, the administration of land use and collective property. The re- sult of this pattern： eliminate the administration of land use performance, the government＇s market pow- er profit mechanism and dissipation of collective welfare, social capital strength and social participa- tion is weak. The imbalance allocation distribution of property and risk （instability） is caused by the imbalance land rights and obligations, This is the cost of incremental reform. The further institutional change of land management will follow the existing pattern of this model.