文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Optimal Tag-Based Cooperation Control for the "Prisoner's Dilemma

作者：Dong, Rui[1,2];Jia, Xinghong[3];Wang, Xianjia[2,4];Chen, Yonggang[1]

第一作者：Dong, Rui

通讯作者：Dong, R[1];Dong, R[2];Jia, XH[3]

机构：[1]Henan Inst Sci & Technol, Sch Math Sci, Xinxiang 453003, Henan, Peoples R China;[2]Wuhan Univ, Inst Syst Engn, Wuhan 430072, Peoples R China;[3]Henan Univ Econ & Law, Sch E Commerce & Logist Management, Zhengzhou 450046, Peoples R China;[4]Wuhan Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Wuhan 430072, Peoples R China

第一机构：Henan Inst Sci & Technol, Sch Math Sci, Xinxiang 453003, Henan, Peoples R China

通讯机构：[1]corresponding author), Henan Inst Sci & Technol, Sch Math Sci, Xinxiang 453003, Henan, Peoples R China;[2]corresponding author), Wuhan Univ, Inst Syst Engn, Wuhan 430072, Peoples R China;[3]corresponding author), Henan Univ Econ & Law, Sch E Commerce & Logist Management, Zhengzhou 450046, Peoples R China.|[104849]河南财经政法大学电子商务与物流管理学院;[10484]河南财经政法大学;

年份：2020

卷号：2020

外文期刊名：COMPLEXITY

收录：;EI(收录号：20205209689960);Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-85098212860);WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000601201300001)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000601201300001)】；

基金：This paper was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71871171, 61773156, 71871173, and 71801175). This work was also partly supported by the Key Scientific Research Project in Universities of Henan Province (19A120006).

语种：英文

外文关键词：Defects - Game theory

摘要：A long-standing problem in biology, economics, and social sciences is to understand the conditions required for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in evolving populations. This paper investigates how to promote the evolution of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG). Differing from previous approaches, we not only propose a tag-based control (TBC) mechanism but also look at how the evolution of cooperation by TBC can be successfully promoted. The effect of TBC on the evolutionary process of cooperation shows that it can both reduce the payoff of defectors and inhibit defection; although when the cooperation rate is high, TBC will also reduce the payoff of cooperators unless the identified rate of the TBC is large enough. An optimal timing control (OTC) of switched replicator dynamics is designed to consider the control costs, the cooperation rate at terminal time, and the cooperator's payoff. The results show that the switching control (SC) between an optimal identified rate control of the TBC and no TBC can properly not only maintain a high cooperation rate but also greatly enhance the payoff of the cooperators. Our results provide valuable insights for some clusters, for example, logistics parks and government, to regard the decision to promote cooperation.