文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Independent Innovation Incentive Mechanism of the National Independent Innovation Demonstration Zone of China Based on Evolutionary Game

作者：Du, Peijie[1];Tian, Kang[2];Wang, Yanrong[1]

第一作者：Du, Peijie

通讯作者：Wang, YR[1]

机构：[1]North China Univ Water Resource & Elect Power, Sch Management & Econ, Zhengzhou 450046, Peoples R China;[2]Henan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Business Adm, Zhengzhou 450016, Peoples R China

第一机构：North China Univ Water Resource & Elect Power, Sch Management & Econ, Zhengzhou 450046, Peoples R China

通讯机构：[1]corresponding author), North China Univ Water Resource & Elect Power, Sch Management & Econ, Zhengzhou 450046, Peoples R China.

年份：2022

卷号：2022

外文期刊名：COMPLEXITY

收录：;EI(收录号：20222212160259);Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-85130540799);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000815806800002)】；

基金：This research was funded by The Major Research Project of National Social Science Foundation of China, grant number 18VSJ087, Key Project of Soft Science of Science and Technology of Henan, grant number 192400410010, and School-Level Postgraduate Science and Technology Innovation Project, grant number YK-2021-120.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Economic and social effects - Patents and inventions

摘要：Considering the reward and punishment mechanism of the management committee and the complexity of innovation path selection of high-tech and general enterprises, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of independent innovation incentive mechanism in the National Independent Innovation Demonstration Zone of China. Meanwhile, the equilibrium points of the strategy selection are solved for the three. In addition, this paper adopts numerical simulation to analyze the influence of each decision variable on different players' strategic selections. The results show that (1) the initial willingness of the management committee, high-tech and general enterprises has different influences on each other, and these factors such as independent innovation cost, technology spillover coefficient, and patent royalty significantly affect the strategic selection of enterprises; (2) the reward and punishment mechanism of the management committee can enhance the innovation willingness of high-tech and general enterprises, in which these punitive measures can promote further the independent innovation of the two; (3) the greater the innovation subsidy provided by the management committee to high-tech enterprises, the heavier the punishment for general enterprises, and the better the effect of independent innovation incentives. The results can provide theoretical guidance and practical reference for the management committee to formulate the independent innovation incentive policies in the National Independent Innovation Demonstration Zone.