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信息不对称、分析师关注度与增发折价    

Information Asymmetry,Analyst′s Coverage and Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offering

文献类型:期刊文献

中文题名:信息不对称、分析师关注度与增发折价

英文题名:Information Asymmetry,Analyst′s Coverage and Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offering

作者:张军华[1]

第一作者:张军华

机构:[1]河南财经政法大学会计学院

第一机构:河南财经政法大学会计学院

年份:2012

卷号:31

期号:8

起止页码:128-132

中文期刊名:技术经济

外文期刊名:Technology Economics

收录:CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;CSSCI:【CSSCI_E2012_2013】;

基金:国家社会科学基金资助项目"资本成本约束;可持续分红与国有企业价值创造"(11BGL026)

语种:中文

中文关键词:信息不对称;估值分歧;分析师关注度;增发折价

外文关键词:information asymmetry; divergence in valuation; analystr's coverage; SEO underpricing

摘要:以2006—2010年间实施新股增发的我国沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究分析师关注度对增发折价的影响。研究发现:分析师关注度较高的上市公司具有较低的投资者间估值分歧和增发折价;分析师能力和盈余预测分歧对增发折价没有显著影响;分析师关注度的提高给分析师能力强的公司带来的增发折价降低幅度大于给分析师能力不强的公司带来的效果。
Taking A-share listed companies which implemented seasoned equity offering during 2006-2010 as the sample, this paper examines the effect of analystrs coverage on SEO underpricing. The empirical results show as follows:higher analyst coverage is associated with lower di- vergence in valuation of investors and lower SEO underpricing, and is consistent with the effect analystPs coverage on reducing information asym- metry among investors^analyst's ability and forecast dispersion have no significant influence on SEO underpricing^the marginal benefit of addi- tional analyst coverage is larger for SEOs that have been coverageed by analysts with high ability.

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