文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：避免“煮熟的鸭子飞走”:CEO家族属性、伪禀赋效应与并购溢价

英文题名：Avoid “a Cooked Duck Flying Away”: CEO Family Attributes, Pseudo-endowment Effect, and M&A Premiums

作者：王晓颖[1];贾银华[2];马真真[3]

第一作者：王晓颖

机构：[1]深圳大学中国经济特区研究中心,广东深圳518060;[2]河南财经政法大学金融学院,河南郑州450000;[3]中国社会科学院研究生院,北京102488

第一机构：深圳大学中国经济特区研究中心,广东深圳518060

年份：2021

卷号：43

期号：6

起止页码：74-89

中文期刊名：外国经济与管理

外文期刊名：Foreign Economics & Management

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2020】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2021_2022】；

基金：国家社科基金青年项目(18CJL030)

语种：中文

中文关键词：并购溢价;伪禀赋效应;家族CEO

外文关键词：M&A premiums;pseudo-endowment effect;family CEO

摘要："煮熟的鸭子飞走了"通常被用来形容并购失败事件,那么企业是否会为了避免"煮熟的鸭子飞走"而进行溢价支付?本文利用CEO家族属性作为伪禀赋效应个体异质性的代理变量,基于2003—2018年中国上市企业1321个溢价并购事件,采用两阶段最小二乘法(IV-2SLS)进行回归估计,研究发现:与职业经理人担任CEO的企业相比,家族成员担任CEO的企业支付的并购溢价更高,即CEO伪禀赋效应在并购中发挥了重要作用;竞争者越多、并购相对重要性越高,或者并购持续时间越长,都会进一步提高家族CEO支付的并购溢价水平。本研究从个体行为理论视角出发,为并购溢价的成因提供了一个新的理论解释,丰富并深化了并购定价决策的有关研究,同时拓展了家族企业的研究边界。
Mergers and acquisitions(M&As)are an important channel for Chinese companies to acquire strategic assets and improve their competitiveness.Wind statistics show that the amount of domestic M&As in China has increased from 28.2 billion yuan in 2001 to 2,211.8 billion yuan in 2019,and the total scale of M&As has increased by 7798%.Among them,more than 70%of transactions ended with M&As.That is,the price paid by M&A companies is higher than the market value of target companies.M&A premiums are also common in developed countries,ranging from 30%to 50%.However,most M&A companies will experience a decline in stock prices or lower earnings after overpaid M&As,which is the"winners’curse".Even so,why are a large number of companies still willing to pay a premium?In M&A-related news,reporters often describe M&A failure as"a cooked duck flying away".Will companies pay a premium to avoid"a cooked duck flying away"?From the perspective of CEO individual psychological deviation,this paper holds that the buyer CEO psychological ownership deviation is one of the causes of M&A premiums.Psychological ownership deviation effect(or pseudo-endowment effect)refers to an individual systematic behavior deviation that is willing to overpay due to avoiding the loss of the future ownership of the target.Before the announcement of M&As,the CEO of M&A companies will invest a lot of resources to screen,interview and investigate target companies.In other words,the opportunity cost of giving up the"cooked duck"is prohibitively high.To avoid such potential losses,the CEO’s willingness to pay is likely to be higher than the market value of target companies.Furthermore,according to the principal-agent theory and the social-emotional wealth theory,family CEOs are more likely to have psychological ownership of target companies,and their loss aversion is stronger.Therefore,family CEOs will perform a stronger pseudoendowment effect than professional CEOs(non-family CEOs).Based on 1,321 M&A premium events of China’s A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2018,this paper uses CEO family attributes as the proxy variable of the heterogeneity of pseudo-endowment effect,and uses the IV-2 SLS estimation method to control the potential endogenous problems.The result finds that:(1)Compared with nonfamily CEO companies,family CEO companies will pay higher M&A premiums.(2)The more the potential competitors,the larger the relative scale of M&As,or the longer the duration of M&As,the stronger the positive correlation between CEO family attributes and M&A premiums.This paper breaks through the traditional theoretical framework based on the assumption of rationality and rational expectation.Starting from the important fact of ownership transfer,this paper explores the impact of CEO individual cognitive bias on its M&A pricing decision,and provides a new theoretical perspective for the abnormal phenomenon of premiums.It not only expands the research boundary of M&A premiums and family business,but also has practical implications for companies to improve the accuracy of M&A pricing.First of all,family CEO companies need to take measures to reduce the individual cognitive bias of CEOs,such as increasing the voice of independent directors or employing professional third-party evaluation agencies.Second,when the scale of M&As is larger or the duration is longer,the willingness to pay of professional CEOs is more rational,and their decision-making efficiency is higher than that of family CEOs.