文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：关键审计事项披露改变了审计师的审计责任意识吗?--基于审计定价视角

英文题名：Does the Disclosure of Critical Audit Matters (CAMs) Alter the Auditors’ Audit Responsibility Awareness?--A Research from the Perspective of Audit Pricing

作者：潘克勤[1]

第一作者：潘克勤

机构：[1]河南财经政法大学会计学院,河南郑州450046

第一机构：河南财经政法大学会计学院

年份：2020

卷号：37

期号：3

起止页码：108-116

中文期刊名：经济经纬

外文期刊名：Economic Survey

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2017】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2019_2020】；

基金：国家社会科学重点项目(19AGL011);河南省高校哲学社会科学创新团队(2015-CXTD-09);河南省教育厅人文社科项目(2018-ZZJH-039)。

语种：中文

中文关键词：关键审计事项;审计意见变化;审计定价增长;双重差分

外文关键词：CAMs;Audit Opinion and Its Change;Audit Pricing and Its Growth;DID

摘要：利用沪深A股上市公司2017年年报审计首次执行关键审计事项准则这个准自然实验契机,以审计定价及其变化作为审计师感知到的审计责任,以被出具的审计意见类型作为客户风险的度量,探讨新准则实施、客户风险与审计师感知到的审计责任变化的关系。采用双重差分方法分析发现:首次执行关键审计事项准则后,被审计单位风险越大,则审计定价越高,审计定价增长幅度越大,但低风险客户的审计定价反而下降;2017年相较于2016年如果客户风险加剧,则审计定价越高、涨幅越大,但2016年相较于2015年却没有该现象,说明首次实施关键审计事项披露准则强化了审计师对高风险客户的审计责任意识,审计师通过风险溢价调整事前做出了风险补偿,同时,披露关键审计事项降低了审计师对于低风险客户的审计责任。
This paper using a quasi-experimental design about Chinese listed firms which carry out the No. 1504 audit standards for Chinese certified public accountants for the first time in 2017 as the research opportunity, using the audit price and its change as the substitute variable for audit responsibility, and using audit opinions as the substitute variable for clients’ risk, probes into the relationship between the change of audit responsibility and the new audit standard’s implementation. Firstly, using the DID(difference-in-difference) method, it finds that the client’s audit opinion is more rigid, then the audit price and its growth is higher after enforcing the new audit standards, but the low-risk clients’ audit price is reduced. Secondly, if the audit opinion for year 2017 becomes more rigid than the audit opinion for year 2016, then the amount of audit price and its growth is bigger, however, the audit risk changes in 2016 compared with 2015 did not lead to significant changes in audit pricing. It states that, the first implementation of the CAMs standard strengthens the auditor’s awareness of audit responsibility for high-risk clients, and the auditor makes risk compensation in advance through risk premium adjustment. Meanwhile, the disclosure of CAMs further reduces the audit responsibility for low-risk clients.