文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：地方政府税收竞争、产业结构调整与中国区域绿色发展

英文题名：Local Government's Tax Competition, Industrial Structure Adjustment and Regional Green Development in China

作者：李子豪[1,2];毛军[3]

第一作者：李子豪

机构：[1]河南财经政法大学国际经济与贸易学院;[2]河南省区域产业创新与发展软科学研究基地;[3]海南师范大学数学与统计学院

第一机构：河南财经政法大学国际经济与贸易学院

年份：2018

卷号：39

期号：12

起止页码：142-157

中文期刊名：财贸经济

外文期刊名：Finance & Trade Economics

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2017】；社科基金资助期刊;CSSCI:【CSSCI2017_2018】；

基金：国家社会科学基金项目“反腐败与地方政府环境治理提升研究”(15CGL042);国家自然科学基金项目“全球价值链嵌入视阈下中国制造业技术进步偏向的碳减排机制研究”(U1704133);河南财经政法大学青年拔尖人才资助计划。

语种：中文

中文关键词：地方政府税收竞争;产业结构调整;区域绿色发展

外文关键词：Local Government's Tax Competition;Industrial Structure Adjustment;Regional Green Development

摘要：基于中国2000—2014年的省际面板数据,以反映区域经济发展和生态环境状况的"生态效率"衡量区域绿色发展,运用Dagum基尼系数测算中国区域绿色发展的地区差异,利用空间面板联立方程估计,本文较为系统地考察了地方政府税收竞争、产业结构调整对中国区域绿色发展的影响机制和效果。研究发现,(1)研究期内中国省域绿色发展水平有所提高,但区域绿色发展空间分布差距有所扩大。(2)本地政府税收竞争、产业结构的工业化将直接对本地绿色发展产生负面影响;邻近地区的税收竞争、工业化发展也将通过"逐底竞争"的负向激励抑制本地绿色发展。由此可见,规范地方政府税收竞争行为、合理引导地方产业结构有效升级,对新时代中国区域经济高质量增长、地区之间绿色协调发展具有重要的政策含义。
Based on the inter-provincial panel data from 2000 to 2014 in China, this paper, takes the "eco-efficiency" which reflects the regional economic development and ecological environment as the index to measure regional green development, uses Dagum Gini coefficient to calculate the differences in green development between regions in China, and applies the spatial panel simultaneous-equations mode1 to test the impact of local government’s tax competition and industrial structure adjustment on the regional green development in China. The conclusions are as follows:(1) The overall gap in the spatial distribution of regional green development in China is expanding. The spatial distribution gap of regional green development has expanded, and the regional gap is the main reason of the overall gap.(2) Local government’s tax competition and industrial development have a negative impact on green development. In terms of the impact of tax competition and industrialization on the local green development in the neighboring regions, the both will suppress local green development through the negative incentives of "race to the bottom". Evidently, regulating the tax competition behavior of the local government and rationally guiding the upgrading of local industrial structure have important policy implications for the high-quality growth of China’s regional economy and the green, coordinated development between regions in the new era.