文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Analysis of collaborative urban public crisis governance in complex system: A multi-agent stochastic evolutionary game approach

作者：Shan, Shao-nan[1];Zhang, Zi-cheng[2];Ji, Wen-yan[3,5];Wang, He[4,5]

第一作者：Shan, Shao-nan

通讯作者：Shan, SN[1]

机构：[1]Shenyang Univ, Sch Business, Shenyang 110044, Peoples R China;[2]Nanjing Univ, Sch Informat Management, Nanjing 210023, Peoples R China;[3]Beijing City Univ, Res Base Capital City Environm Construct, Beijing 100083, Peoples R China;[4]Henan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Foreign Languages, Zhengzhou 450046, Peoples R China;[5]Capital Univ Econ & Business, Sch Urban Econ & Publ Adm, Beijing 100070, Peoples R China

第一机构：Shenyang Univ, Sch Business, Shenyang 110044, Peoples R China

通讯机构：[1]corresponding author), Shenyang Univ, Sch Business, Shenyang 110044, Peoples R China.

年份：2023

卷号：91

外文期刊名：SUSTAINABLE CITIES AND SOCIETY

收录：;EI(收录号：20230613549671);Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-85147246722);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000935422700001)】；

基金：This study was supported by grants from MOE (Ministry of Education in China) Project of Humanities and Social Sciences (Grant No. 22YJC630113) and Huamao Financial Research Institute, Henan University of Economics and Law, Project of Humanities and Social Sciences (Grant No. 21HM36).

语种：英文

外文关键词：Urban public crisis governance; Multi -agent collaboration; Stochastic evolutionary models; System dynamics

摘要：As the world economy is leaping forward, countries have been exposed to the constant threat of public crises. Accelerated urbanization has currently led to a proliferation of urban public crisis events. Conventional governance methods become ineffective under the effect of the highly uncertain and dynamic nature of urban public crisis events. Accordingly, this study primarily aims to facilitate the construction of a collaborative multi-agent alliance in urban public crisis governance. Thus, evolutionary game theory is combined with system dynamics, Gaussian white noise stochastic disturbance terms are introduced to model the complex characteristics of urban public crisis events, and evolutionary game models and stochastic evolutionary game models are built for three types of groups (i.e., local governments, enterprises, and the public) to study the evolutionary process of group strategy choice behavior with or without central government supervision. The result of this study suggests that under the effect of the complexity factor, the central government's dynamic reward and punishment mechanism plays a role of in reaching a facilitative and stable alliance for collaborative urban public crisis governance. Furthermore, contributions, unresolved issues and vital challenges are identified. In this study, a solid basis is laid for future research and widespread use of collaborative urban public crisis governance, which provides a reference for stakeholders in the field of urban public crisis governance.