登录    注册    忘记密码

详细信息

金融资产配置、管理层权力与审计师选择    

Financial Asset Allocation,Management Power and Auditor Choice

文献类型:期刊文献

中文题名:金融资产配置、管理层权力与审计师选择

英文题名:Financial Asset Allocation,Management Power and Auditor Choice

作者:张会芹[1]

第一作者:张会芹

机构:[1]河南财经政法大学会计学院,河南郑州450046

第一机构:河南财经政法大学会计学院

年份:2021

卷号:38

期号:5

起止页码:121-130

中文期刊名:经济经纬

外文期刊名:Economic Survey

收录:CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2020】;CSSCI:【CSSCI2021_2022】;

基金:河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2020BJJ008)。

语种:中文

中文关键词:金融资产配置;代理成本;管理层权力;审计师选择;

外文关键词:Financial Asset Allocation;Agent Cost;Management Power;Auditor Choice

摘要:以2009—2019年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,研究实体企业金融资产配置是否以及如何影响审计师选择。研究发现:(1)实体企业金融资产配置影响审计师选择。机制分析表明,企业持有金融资产增加了代理成本,董事会倾向于选择高质量的"十大"事务所予以监督。(2)金融资产配置影响审计师选择并受管理层权力配置的调节。在管理层主导的公司,董事会聘请高质量审计师予以监督的能力被削弱。管理层权力的调节效应表现出较大的截面差异,当公司主业盈利能力不强、所处市场化程度低以及面临分析师关注度不高时,管理层权力的削弱效应明显。研究结论表明强劲的主业盈利能力、良好的市场环境和较高的分析师关注能够有效约束管理层的自利行为,弥补公司治理层面管理层权力过大带来的治理风险。
This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2019 as the research samples to study whether and how the financial asset allocation of entity enterprises affects the choice of auditors.There are following findings:(1)The financial asset allocation of entity enterprises affects the choice of auditors.The mechanism analysis shows that the holding of financial assets increases the agency cost,and the board of directors tends to choose high-quality"top ten"firms to supervise.(2)The influence of financial asset allocation on auditor selection is also regulated by management power.In management-leading companies,the ability of the board of directors to employ high-quality auditors to supervise is weakened.And the regulatory effect shows a large cross-sectional differences.The weakening effect of management power is obvious under the circumstances of weak main business profitability,low degree of marketization and lower analysts’attention.The results show that the strong profitability of the main business,good market environment and high analyst attention can effectively restrain the self-interest behavior of the management and make up for the governance risk caused by the excessive power of the management in the corporate governance level.

参考文献:

正在载入数据...

版权所有©河南财经政法大学 重庆维普资讯有限公司 渝B2-20050021-8 
渝公网安备 50019002500408号 违法和不良信息举报中心