文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Information sharing strategy in supply chains: The role of C2M

作者：Chen, Xue[1,2];Li, Bo[3,4];Wang, Minxue[3]

第一作者：Chen, Xue

通讯作者：Li, B[1]

机构：[1]Henan Univ Econ & Law, Sch Business & Adm, Zhengzhou 450001, Peoples R China;[2]Henan Univ, Business Sch, Kaifeng 475004, Peoples R China;[3]Tianjin Univ, Coll Management & Econ, Tianjin 300072, Peoples R China;[4]Tianjin Univ, Coll Management & Econ, 92 Weijin Rd, Tianjin 300072, Peoples R China

第一机构：河南财经政法大学工商管理学院

通讯机构：[1]corresponding author), Tianjin Univ, Coll Management & Econ, 92 Weijin Rd, Tianjin 300072, Peoples R China.

年份：2024

卷号：247

外文期刊名：EXPERT SYSTEMS WITH APPLICATIONS

收录：;EI(收录号：20240615488282);Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-85183948579);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:001171544600001)】；

基金：The authors are grateful to the editor and the anonymous reviewers. This work was supported by the Henan University of Economics and Law [grant number GS202206, 23HNCDXJ29] and Major Program of the National Social Science Foundation of China [grant number 21 & ZD102] .

语种：英文

外文关键词：Demand information sharing; Consumer -to -manufacturer; Pricing; Sales service; Competition

摘要：This paper constructs a supply chain model consisting of two manufacturers and one platform, where the platform provides sales service to enhance the demand. The platform has demand information and decides whether and with which manufacturer to share the information. In practice, if the platform shares the information, the manufacturer can use the shared information to guide pricing decisions and further use Consumer-toManufacturer (C2M) strategy to drive product production. C2M means that the manufacturer produces products based on the shared information, making products satisfy consumers' needs, thereby increasing the market demand. Therefore, this paper uses a theoretical model to answer a key question: considering the role of C2M, whether the platform prefers to share demand information with others, and if the platform shares, which strategy is most beneficial to each player? First, this paper obtains the optimal equilibrium solutions under three strategies, that is, no information sharing (strategy NN), information sharing with one manufacturer (strategy SN or strategy NS), and information sharing with two manufacturers (strategy SS). Second, this paper derives that the information effect is the highest for all players under strategy SS. Whether the platform shares information with one or two manufacturers, the market effect has positive influences on both players. The cost effect does not affect the platform but hurts the informed manufacturer. Third, the conditions of the platform sharing information are obtained. There is a sales service efficiency threshold, if the sales service is more efficient, the platform shares the information with one manufacturer; otherwise, strategy SS is optimal. Fourth, through comparative analysis, this paper points out that when the C2M costs are lower, both manufacturers prefer the platform to choose strategy SS. Interestingly, when the C2M costs are higher, both manufacturers want the competitor to have information, which is different from the conclusions of previous studies. In addition, strategy SS makes the platform, and two manufacturers achieve Pareto optimality under certain conditions. Finally, the results are verified by numerical experiments.