文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：银行风险识别、政府财政补贴与企业债务融资成本——基于沪深两市2007-2012年公司数据的实证检验

英文题名：Bank Risk Identification,Government Subsidies and Corporate Debt Cost——An Empirical Study Based on Data of Listed Companies from 2007 to 2012

作者：申香华[1]

第一作者：申香华

机构：[1]河南财经政法大学会计学院

第一机构：河南财经政法大学会计学院

年份：2014

期号：9

起止页码：62-71

中文期刊名：财贸经济

外文期刊名：Finance & Trade Economics

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2011】；社科基金资助期刊;CSSCI:【CSSCI2014_2016】；

基金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目"营利性组织财政补贴:倾向性;经济绩效与监管制度安排"(批准号10YJA790156)的阶段性研究成果

语种：中文

中文关键词：财政补贴;风险识别;银行信贷;债务成本

外文关键词：Fiscal Subsidies, Risk Identification, Bank Credit, Debt Cost

摘要：银行信贷是中国企业最重要的资本来源,信贷资源配置的决定因素和定价机制也是银行、企业、学界及其他相关方关注的重点。本文通过理论分析认为财政补贴作为政府对企业的隐性担保机制,能降低银行对企业的风险评估,进而降低企业债务成本。基于此,本文以沪深两市2007-2012年公司数据为样本,实证检验银行风险识别能力、政府财政补贴和企业债务成本的关系。研究发现银行在信贷资源定价上具备显著的风险识别能力,对高风险公司要求更高的利率。财政补贴有降低银行风险评估级别,从而降低公司债务融资成本的作用,但该作用只在财政补贴力度足够大,使公司由营业利润小于零的高风险公司变为盈利公司时才显著。说明在银行重视信贷风险管理的市场行为下,政府有重点、有针对性的财政补贴能引导信贷资源优化配置。
Bank credit is the most important source of determinants of credit resource allocation and pricing capital for the Chinese enterprises, and the mechanism are also the focuses of banks, enterprises, academia and other related parties. Based on theoretical analysis, this paper holds that, as a kind of implicit guarantee, fiscal subsidy can decrease debt cost by degrading the debt risk. Based on this, the paper takes the corporate data from the stock markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2012 as a sample and conducts an empirical research on the relationship among the bank＇s ability on risk identification, government subsidies and the corporate debt cost. The result indicates that banks have remarkable ability of risk identification on pricing the credit resource, and demand higher interest rates for high-risk companies. Government subsidies can reduce banks＇ risk assessment level, so as to reduce the cost of corporate credit financing. However, this effect is significant only when the fiscal subsidy is large enough to turn the high-risk corporate with negative operating profit into the profit-making corporate. This result shows that intensive and purposeful subsidies can optimize the allocation of credit resources when the banks pay attention to the management of credit risks.