文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：制度约束、利益博弈与农村信用社改革

英文题名：Institutional Contraint,Interest Gaming and Rurual Credit Cooperative Reformation

作者：王桂堂[1]

机构：[1]河南财经学院财金系

第一机构：河南财经政法大学财政税务学院

年份：2005

卷号：23

期号：5

起止页码：42-45

中文期刊名：河南金融管理干部学院学报

外文期刊名：Journal of Henan College of Financial Management Cadres

语种：中文

中文关键词：农村信用社;利益博弈;制度安排

外文关键词：rurual credit cooperative ; interest gaming; institutional arrangement

摘要：我国农信社体制的变迁与发展,是数十年来各种社会经济问题的集中反映,也是制度约束的必然结果,由此构成了中国农村信用社体制改革问题的艰巨性与复杂性。从利益博弈的角度分析,每一轮农信社体制的改革都将引发一场利益关系的博弈,博弈的均衡点就是此轮改革的结局。希望在农村信用社改革的框架之内解决农村金融服务体系的全部或大部分问题是不切实际的。
The evolution and development of China＇ s rurual credit cooperative regime is an intensive reflection of various social and economic problems in several decades, and is the inevitable result of institutional constraint, hence, making China＇ s rurual credit cooperative reformation problem arduous and complex. Analysizing from the prospect of interest game, each cycle of rurual credit cooperative reformation will cause a game of interest relationship, and the equilibrium spot of gaming is the result of each reformation cycle. It＇ s not realistic to hope all or most problems of rurual financial service system can be solved within the framework of rurual credit cooperative reformation.